Maryland Supreme Court: Protective order, arbitration, sentencing, more

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Appeals; waiver

BOTTOM LINE: Where father argued the circuit court erred in scheduling the final protective order hearing more than seven days from service of the temporary protective order without stating on the record whether good cause existed to do so, but this issue was not preserved for appellate review, when it otherwise easily could have been, it was waived.

CASE: Clarke v. Gibson, No. 1, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Nov. 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, EAVES, Killough).

FACTS: On Feb. 7, 2024, Chinyere Gibson filed against Philip Clarke, her former spouse a petition for protection from child abuse on behalf of A.C. (then 11 years old) and O.C. (then 9 years old). That same day, the circuit court conducted an ex parte hearing, determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Clarke committed child abuse, and granted Ms. Gibson a temporary protective order for the children.

Because the court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that child abuse occurred, the court was required to forward the case to Anne Arundel County’s Department of Social Services, or DSS, to conduct an investigation and complete a report for the court in time for the final protective order hearing. To give DSS time to conduct its investigation and write its report, the court scheduled the final hearing for February 23.

At the final hearing, Ms. Gibson proceeded unrepresented, and Mr. Clarke appeared represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted Ms. Gibson a final protective order, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

LAW: Mr. Clarke first advances various arguments as to why the circuit court erred in scheduling the final protective order hearing more than seven days from service of the temporary protective order without stating on the record whether good cause existed to do so. The record demonstrates that this issue was not preserved for appellate review, when it otherwise easily could have been. Mr. Clarke has not argued any reason why we should exercise discretion and address this issue under Rule 8-131(a).

Mr. Clarke next alleges that the circuit court violated his right to procedural due process when it issued a temporary protective order on the partial basis of physical child abuse even though Ms. Gibson did not allege acts of physical abuse in her petition. The court holds that, where, as here, the temporary protective order itself provides adequate notice of the reasonable grounds the court finds to believe abuse has occurred, service of such a temporary protective order on a respondent satisfies the respondent’s procedural due process right to notice.

In this case, Mr. Clarke adequately was notified of the time and place of the final protective order hearing, the pertinent allegations against him, the potential relief that could be awarded against him, the possible length of a final protective order and was heard on the issue of whether the court should issue a final protective order. Thus, in this case, the circuit court did not violate Mr. Clarke’s right to procedural due process.

Turning to the merits, absent a respondent’s consent to the entry of a protective order, a court may issue a final protective order only if the court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred[.]”But a factfinder’s “prerogative not to believe certain testimony, however, does not constitute affirmative evidence of the contrary.” Here, in affirming the circuit court’s decision to award Ms. Gibson a final protective order, the Appellate Court erred in affirming the circuit court’s decision to grant the final protective order solely on the basis that the circuit court did not find credible Mr. Clarke’s testimony.

Because the Appellate Court cabined its assessment of the evidence before the circuit court to the circuit court’s disbelief of Mr. Clarke’s denials, this court vacates the Appellate Court’s opinion with respect to that issue and remands the matter back to that court with instructions to evaluate the entire record before the circuit court to determine whether it supports the circuit court’s judgment.

Judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Contract; assignment

BOTTOM LINE: Where a lender argued it was entitled to arbitration of a dispute with the purchaser of an automobile, because the assignment of a financing contract to the lender included the assignment of a separate purchase order containing an arbitration clause, this argument failed. The lender was assigned only the financing contract and therefore was not an assignee of the arbitration provision in the purchase contract.

CASE: Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 2, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Nov. 25, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: In this dispute between the purchaser of a used car and the lender that financed that purchase, this court must determine whether the circuit court erred in granting the lender’s motion to compel arbitration. The purchaser and the car dealership signed two contracts: one that established the purchase price and the other that established the financing terms.

The purchase contract included a provision requiring the parties to arbitrate certain types of disputes. The financing contract contained no such requirement, but did contain language providing that: (1) it was immediately assigned to the lender and (2) upon its assignment, the lender’s contract with the buyer consisted of only the financing contract and any addenda to the financing contract.

The lender argued that, as the assignee of the financing contract, it was also the assignee of the purchase contract and, hence, the arbitration agreement contained therein. The purchaser, on the other hand, disputed that the purchase contract included a binding arbitration agreement but argued that, even if it did, the lender was assigned only the financing contract and therefore was not an assignee of the arbitration agreement. The circuit court agreed with the lender on both issues and granted its motion to compel arbitration. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in a reported opinion.

LAW: The court assumes, without deciding, that assume without deciding that the arbitration provisions referenced in the purchase contract created a binding obligation between Mr. Lyles and Deer Auto. Even accepting this premise, any such arbitration agreement was not within the scope of the assignment from Deer Auto to Santander.

Contract rights can be assigned in whole or in part. Determining the scope of an assignment does not turn on whether the transaction was documented in a single instrument or multiple instruments. Rather, it turns on the specific language used in the provisions governing the assignment. Here, the financing contract’s plain language provides that the thing assigned to Santander was Deer Auto’s entire interest in “this contract.” Because the arbitration provisions Santander seeks to enforce are contained only in the purchase contract, the court must determine whether, as Santander insists, “this contract”—the financing contract—incorporates the purchase contract.

The financing contract’s integration clause reads: “This contract, along with all other documents signed by you in connection with the purchase of this vehicle, comprise the entire agreement between you and us affecting this purchase. No oral agreements or understandings are binding. Upon assignment of this contract: (i) only this contract and the addenda to this contract comprise the entire agreement between you and the assignee relating to this contract; (ii) any change to this contract must be in writing and the assignee must sign it; and (iii) no oral changes are binding.”

By providing that “only this contract and the addenda to this contract comprise the entire agreement between you and the assignee,” the third sentence excludes from the “entire agreement” with the assignee what the first sentence included in the “entire agreement” with the dealer: “all other documents signed by you in connection with the purchase of this vehicle.” The purchase contract falls squarely within that excluded category; therefore, neither the purchase contract nor the arbitration provisions referenced within it were included within the assignment to Santander.

Santander’s interpretation—that “this contract” includes the purchase contract—would render the bifurcated structure of the RISC’s integration clause superfluous. If “this contract” includes the purchase contract, there is no reason to distinguish between the pre-assignment scope (“this contract, along with all other documents . . .”) and the post-assignment scope (“only this contract and the addenda . . .”). The limiting word “only” would serve no function. The court rejects an interpretation that strips this word of all meaning.

Judgement of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed.

Criminal; sentencing

BOTTOM LINE: Where the trial judge revised the sentence during an ongoing sentencing colloquy—before the proceeding concluded and without remanding defendant to custody, taking a recess or calling the next case, the revised sentence applied to the defendant. A trial court retains authority to alter an announced sentence so long as the sentencing phase remains open, and the proceeding has not concluded.

CASE: Reyes v. State, No. 17, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Nov. 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH).

FACTS: A jury found Jefferey Reyes guilty of second-degree assault, and the court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, suspending all but nine months (to be served under home detention), followed by three years of supervised probation. Earlier in the hearing, however, the judge announced a sentence of one year, suspending all but nine months (to be served under home detention), followed by three years of supervised probation.

Following that initial announcement, while the court was advising Reyes of his appellate rights, the prosecutor interrupted with a question about the sentence. A colloquy ensued, and the judge increased Reyes’ sentence after stating on the record that she had misunderstood the maximum available sentence under the sentencing guidelines.

Reyes argued on appeal that the trial court judge at sentencing had illegally increased his sentence after it had been imposed. He contended that “once the sentence was announced, the court’s authority to increase the sentence was circumscribed by Maryland Rule 4-345, which permits such an increase only if the original sentence was illegal, if there was some fraud, mistake or irregularity, or if the court made a mistake in announcing the original sentence.” The Appellate Court disagreed and held that Reyes’ sentence was not illegally increased because a criminal sentence is not “imposed” until after the sentencing proceeding has concluded.

LAW: Maryland Rule 4-345, titled, “Sentencing—Revisory Power of Court,” operates within two complementary frameworks. First, it preserves the long-standing policy against increasing an already imposed sentence—reflecting both constitutional protections and common-law finality. Second, it recognizes the practical necessity that sentencing proceedings remain—until formally concluded—fluid, allowing a trial court to correct or clarify an announced sentence while the defendant remains in the courtroom.

The record here shows that the trial judge revised the sentence during an ongoing sentencing colloquy—before the proceeding concluded and without remanding Reyes to custody, taking a recess or calling the next case. The judge initially stated that she would “take the recommendation of the State,” but would allow Reyes to choose between 90 days in the county detention center or nine months on home detention; Reyes chose nine months on home detention.

After explaining what home detention entailed, the judge summarized the sentence she intended to impose as “one year, suspend all but nine months, to be served on home detention with credit for two days, and followed by three years of supervised probation.” While the court was advising Reyes of his post-trial rights, the prosecutor interjected to ask whether the nine months counted as active time or part of the probationary term, noting that under the initial formulation only three months of “backup” active time would be available for a probation violation and requesting a greater exposed term.

In response, and while the colloquy remained open, the court revised its pronouncement and imposed a five-year term, suspending all but nine months to be served on county home detention, followed by three years of supervised probation. Nothing in the transcript indicates that the sentencing proceeding had concluded before the revision. A trial court retains authority to alter an announced sentence so long as the sentencing phase remains open, and the proceeding has not concluded.

Reyes contends that under Rule 4-345(c), a court may only correct an “evident mistake” after pronouncement and that any other change constitutes an impermissible increase. But that argument presupposes that the initial one-year term was “imposed” within the meaning of our caselaw. As this court’s cases make clear, Rule 4-345(c) governs post-imposition corrections; it does not restrict a court’s inherent authority to revise a sentence before final imposition. To hold otherwise would conflate the act of announcing a sentence with its legal imposition, which would run contrary to this court’s prior decisions.

Finally, the practical considerations underlying the caselaw and Rule 4-345 reinforce the outcome here. Sentencing proceedings are dynamic and unscripted. Judges often respond to argument, allocutions and victim impact statements, clarify statutory requirements, determine sentencing guideline ranges and correct misunderstandings in real time. The law must allow reasonable flexibility for those corrections so long as the proceeding has not concluded.

To require absolute finality at the very moment an announced sentence is first uttered would produce potentially perverse consequences, unduly constraining a trial judge’s ability to correct an announced sentence on the spot and placing an unwarranted restriction on judicial discretion by interfering with the court’s ability to impose an appropriate sentence. Rule 4-345 safeguards against post-sentencing proceeding increases, thereby protecting defendants from surprise or unfairness once the sentence has been imposed.

Judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.

Insurance; jurisdiction

BOTTOM LINE: Where an automobile policyholder accepted $30,000 from the insurer of the woman who hit his vehicle, and then sued his own insurer for the remaining $20,000 left on his uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, that $20,000 claim did not exceed the jurisdiction of the District Court.

CASE: Bowens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 10, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Nov. 24, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, KILLOUGH).

FACTS: Uninsured and underinsured motorist, or UIM, coverage is statutorily required in every motor vehicle liability policy issued in Maryland. This mandatory coverage protects insured drivers from out-of-pocket losses when the responsible motorist is uninsured or inadequately insured to cover the full extent of the insured’s injuries.

In this case, after a vehicle driven by Lisa Daniels struck a vehicle driven by George Bowens, Daniels’ insurer offered to settle Bowens’ claim for the full $30,000 policy limits. Danies’ insurer (State Farm) consented to the settlement. After receiving the $30,000 settlement from Daniels’ insurer, Bowens sought payment of the remaining $20,000 available under his $50,000 State Farm UIM policy. State Farm denied the claim. Bowens then filed a breach of contract action against State Farm in District Court seeking to recover $20,000 in UIM benefits

State Farm argued to the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction to award Bowens
$20,000, because, to do so, it would necessarily have to find that Bowens’ total damages were $50,000—an amount exceeding the District Court’s $30,000 jurisdictional limit. The District Court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss, and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed.

The question thus presented in this appeal is whether, for purposes of establishing jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland under § 4-401(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the phrase “debt or damages claimed” includes sums previously paid to the insured by the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, or only the amounts the plaintiff seeks to recover in uninsured or underinsured benefits.

LAW: On its face, CJP § 4-401(1) is plain and unambiguous: “[I]f the debt or damages claimed do not exceed $30,000,” the case belongs in District Court. The question here is what constitutes the “debt or damages claimed” for purposes of the District Court’s jurisdiction. Bowens’ total injuries associated with the accident amount to $50,000—above the District Court’s jurisdictional limit—but he has already received $30,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer.

State Farm argues that to recover $20,000, Bowens must prove that his total damages from the collision with Daniels were at least $50,000—an amount beyond the District Court’s jurisdictional limits. State Farm argues that while Bowens’ claim is technically a contract action, it is functionally a tort case where Bowens is required to prove his economic and non-economic damages resulting from the Daniels vehicle collision. From that premise, State Farm concludes the District Court lacks jurisdiction because the underlying tort damages—rather than the amount demanded from the insurer—exceed CJP § 4-401(1)’s $30,000 limit.

Although Bowens’ underlying tort damages are claimed to be $50,000, he seeks recovery on a debt—an interest in money—and the debt he claims, capped at $20,000 in his complaint, falls within the District Court’s jurisdiction. It is immaterial that a District Court judge may have to find that the tortfeasor caused damages exceeding $30,000 in order for Bowens to recover under his UIM policy with State Farm. District Court judges routinely assess liability and damages and apply statutory offsets and policy limits. Nothing in the jurisdictional scheme prohibits District Court judges from performing that calculation.

State Farm’s “functional tort case” argument also overlooks the operation of the UIM statutory scheme: once Bowens accepted Daniels’ $30,000 policy limit settlement, that portion of the tort claim was extinguished and the only live controversy was Bowens’
$20,000 contract claim against State Farm, which accrued when State Farm denied his UIM claim.

Order of the Prince George’s County Circuit Court reversed.

Landlord and tenant; mootness

BOTTOM LINE: Where tenants of two rental units of an unlicensed residential property filed rent escrow complaints seeking repairs and the return of rent paid during the unlicensed period, and the District Court required the tenants to pay rent into escrow going forward and dismissed their rent escrow complaints when they refused to do so, their appeal was dismissed as moot. Both tenants vacated their apartments during the appeal.

CASE: Wilson v. Tanglewood Venture LP, No. 20, Sept. Term, 2025 (filed Nov. 24, 2025) (Justices Booth, Biran, GOULD, Eaves, Killough) (Justice WATTS joins majority opinion with explanation) (Justice FADER concurs).

FACTS: The primary issue in this appeal is whether, in a landlord-tenant action in which the rent escrow statute, Md. Code Ann., Real Prop., or RP, § 8-211, is invoked, courts may require tenants to pay rent into escrow when the rental property lacks the license required by local law.

Tenants of two rental units of an unlicensed residential property filed rent escrow complaints seeking repairs and the return of rent paid during the unlicensed period. The tenants argued that they should not be required to pay rent into escrow to secure the benefits of the rent escrow statute because under Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offices of Edward J. Maher, P.C., 480 Md. 394 (2022), they owed no rent while the property was unlicensed. The District Court disagreed and ordered them to pay rent into escrow going forward. After the tenants declined, the District Court dismissed their rent escrow complaints.

LAW: No live controversy remains between the parties. Ms. Gross vacated her apartment prior to the circuit court proceedings, and Mr. Wilson vacated his apartment in May 2025, after the circuit court dismissed tenants’ appeal. With tenants having no possessory interest remaining in the property, there is no rent to abate, and landlord presently owes tenants no duty to fix the problems in their former units.

Tenants argue that they may face “potential liability for past accruing rent” because landlord sent notices to Mr. Wilson during the circuit court appeal seeking unpaid rent for the unlicensed period and filed failure to pay rent actions against Ms. Gross after she moved out. This court is not persuaded.

First, landlord’s counsel represented to the circuit court that landlord would not seek unpaid rent from tenants attributable to the unlicensed period, and the circuit court relied on this representation in dismissing the appeal. Second, landlord voluntarily dismissed the failure to pay actions it had filed against Ms. Gross after she moved out. Thus this court perceives no basis to find that the dismissal of this appeal would expose tenants to liability for unpaid rent that landlord has expressly disclaimed.

Tenants also claim that “a decreased credit score” could have “a negative impact” on their ability to rent in the future. On this record, the court finds that the dismissal of a rent escrow complaint does not carry the same potential for collateral consequences as an adverse judgment of possession or monetary damages.

Turning to exceptions from the mootness doctrine, the record offers no reasonable basis to expect that tenants would be subject to the same action again, particularly from this landlord, with whom they have no current legal relationship. Thus, the capable of repetition yet evading review exception is not applicable here.

Tenants nevertheless invoke the public interest exception, which applies “when ‘[t]he urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest[.]’” But recent legislative changes made to landlord-tenant law counsel against reaching the merits on this record. The effect of these changes on a tenant’s rights under RP § 8-211 was not briefed or argued in the district and circuit courts; thus, addressing the merits here would provide guidance for a legal framework that no longer exists while offering uncertain direction for cases arising under current law.

Appeal dismissed.

JOINDER: I write separately to state with clarity that when the General Assembly enacted RP § 8-406, it essentially overruled this court’s holding in Velicky v. Copycat Bldg. LLC, 476 Md. 435 (2021).

CONCUR: I write separately to make one additional point about a possible tension in the law that the General Assembly may want to address. When a landlord is unlicensed due to an administrative error by the licensing authority or because of conditions in a different unit of a multi-unit property, there is arguably a tension between (1) the common law rule adopted in Assanah-Carroll, prohibiting the use of the courts to collect unpaid rent attributable to a period in which the landlord was unlicensed and (2) the statutory rule in § 8-406, allowing a landlord to use a failure-to-pay-rent action to summarily eject the tenant.

Sanctions; indefinite suspension

BOTTOM LINE: Where the Maryland federal court suspended an attorney from practicing before that court for a period of four months, after finding that he violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3, 3.4 and 4.1, the Maryland Supreme Court found that sanction inadequate. It accordingly imposed an indefinite suspension of at least one year.

CASE: Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gillespie, AG No. 27, Sept. Term, 2024 (filed Nov. 21, 2025) (Justices Fader, Watts, Booth, BIRAN, Gould, Eaves, Killough).

FACTS: Tristan Wade Gillespie was admitted to the Bar of this Court on Dec. 28, 2015. He was admitted to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on May 1, 2020.

On August 7, 2024, the district court suspended Gillespie from the practice of law before that court for a period of four months. The suspension stemmed from Gillespie’s representation of two clients with disabilities in more than 600 “tester” cases around the nation. The district court found that Gillespie violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, or MARPC, 3.3, 3.4 and 4.1. The district court ordered Gillespie’s four-month suspension to run nunc pro tunc from July 5, 2023.

On Dec. 6, 2024, the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action, or PDRA, against Gillespie based on his suspension by the district court. In the PDRA, Bar Counsel requested that this Court impose “corresponding discipline.” After Gillespie’s four-month suspension was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, Bar Counsel and Gillespie filed a joint petition for reciprocal action in which they agreed that this Court should impose a four-month suspension, effective nunc pro tunc, from July 5, 2023.

LAW: In a reciprocal discipline case filed under Rule 19-737, this court usually imposes corresponding discipline, provided that “the purpose of the originating jurisdiction’s sanction is congruent with ours[.]” However, this court is not required to impose corresponding discipline in any reciprocal case. Indeed, it has explained that it is “required to assess for ourselves the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission.”

The parties recommended in their jointly filed papers that this court suspend Gillespie for four months, nunc pro tunc, from July 5, 2023. Their position was that a four-month suspension in Maryland would constitute corresponding discipline to the suspension imposed by the district court.

A comparison of the relevant reinstatement provisions demonstrates that an attorney who receives a four-month suspension from this Court has a less onerous path to reinstatement than an attorney who receives a four-month suspension in the district court. In particular, Maryland Rule 19-751(c)(3) does not require an attorney seeking reinstatement to make a showing of fitness to resume the practice of law. In contrast, the district court’s Local Rule 705.4(c)(ii) requires an attorney who has been suspended for more than 90 days to make such a showing.

Based on this court’s review of the applicable reinstatement provisions in the district court compared to those in Maryland, it concludes that corresponding discipline in Maryland for Gillespie is not a four-month suspension. Rather, corresponding discipline in this case would be an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after four months.

The question thus becomes whether this Court should impose corresponding discipline – i.e., an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after four months. To ensure sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed,” this Court considers: (1) the rule(s) of professional conduct that the attorney violated; (2) the attorney’s mental state; (3) the injury that the attorney’s misconduct caused or could have caused and (4) any aggravating and/or mitigating factors, as suggested by the American Bar Association.

This court determines that Gillespie’s pattern of misconduct – which involved the same acts of dishonesty in hundreds of cases – warrants substantially greater discipline in Maryland. A four-month sit-out period would not be commensurate with the nature and gravity of Gillespie’s misconduct. The egregious nature of Gillespie’s misconduct, evidenced by his numerous instances of dishonesty, warrants a more serious sanction.

Under Maryland Rule 19-737(f), this court imposes an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement: (1) no earlier than one year following the date of issuance of this opinion and (2) after Gillespie has been reinstated to practice law in the district court. Today’s decision echoes the growing consensus that a four-month suspension understates the nature and gravity of Gillespie’s misconduct. The protection of the public and the integrity of the legal profession demand more.

So ordered.