Top MD court reverses conviction of Montgomery County man under ‘kingpin’ statute

Listen to this article

A Montgomery County man convicted for standing next to a codefendant who spray-painted a gang symbol on a public wall had his conviction reversed last month by the Maryland Supreme Court, with the justices finding the law under which he was convicted was intended to apply only to gang leaders or “kingpins.”

The 5-2 ruling ordered the reversal of Jamal Antoine Williams’ conviction under § 9-805 of the Maryland Criminal Law Code and ordered his acquittal, determining state prosecutors failed to prove Williams exercised a leadership role in the Rollin 30s Crips or exercised discretionary authority regarding the defacing of a public wall in Silver Spring.

The high court majority largely agreed with Williams’ interpretation of § 9-805, which his counsel argued was intended by Maryland legislators to target gang kingpins.

Under § 9-805, a person is prohibited from organizing, supervising, promoting, sponsoring, financing or managing a criminal organization and subjects the individual to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years, a fine of up to $1 million, or both.

“[W]e conclude that the General Assembly intended CR § 9-805 to function effectively as a ‘kingpin’ statute,” Justice Jonathan Biran wrote for the high court’s majority. “That is, it is designed to reach acts committed by those who exercise a leadership role within a criminal organization or who – if they are not members of the organization – exercise discretion consistent with leadership with respect to the prohibited act.”

Isabelle Raquin and Stephen Mercer of RaquinMercer in Rockville represented Williams before the high court.

“We appreciate the Court’s careful consideration of the Legislature’s intent that the term ‘promote’ should not sweep within the Gang Kingpin statute low-level actors and innocent persons who otherwise would be subjected to the enhanced penalties designed for upper-level leadership of criminal organizations,” Raquin and Mercer said in a statement.

A spokesperson for the Maryland Office of the Attorney General declined to comment Thursday.

Williams brought his appeal to the justices following the Maryland Appellate Court’s finding in October that the Montgomery County Circuit Court had sufficient evidence to convict him of promoting a gang when he stood next to another man who spray-painted a public wall and also posed for a photo with the gang’s graffiti tag.

The state argued before the justices that the court should apply the plain meaning of “promote” with mens rea in order to eliminate potential constitutional problems and provide sufficient guidance to courts that may interpret the statute in the future.

Delegate David Moon, a Democrat representing District 20 in Montgomery County, raised questions in 2016 when the Maryland General Assembly added “promote” and “sponsor” to § 9-805’s list of prohibited acts. According to the opinion, Moon expressed concern that “promote” might be read too broadly and could unintentionally sweep in low-level offenders to be subject to prosecution under the law.

“Ultimately, I’m glad the court came to the conclusion that the kingpin statute wasn’t intended to put someone in prison for decades over graffiti,” Moon said in a phone call Thursday. “I think that’s sort of the plain language understanding of what the kingpin of an operation would be, and so I think they held to a very common-sense interpretation there.”

Moon said he believes the ruling clarifies § 9-805 and sets a precedent for prosecutors using the statute, where charges filed under the law for minor conduct are unlikely to survive scrutiny.

In a dissenting opinion written by Justice Steven Gould and joined by Senior Justice Joseph Getty (who replaced Justice Shirley Watts on the high bench for the case), Gould said the majority’s interpretation of § 9-805 “departs from established interpretive principles.”

Gould wrote legislators’ choice to not delete “promote” from the statute or adopt narrowing language “reflects a conscious choice to retain the plain and unambiguous meaning of the word ‘promote,’ notwithstanding the concerns of some legislators.”

“The majority’s interpretation effectively rewrites the statute based on the policy preferences expressed by a few legislators, rather than the actual text that the General Assembly enacted,” Gould wrote. “This practice, in my view, will encourage legislators to provide self-serving testimony to support their policy preferences and discourage legislators from offering and negotiating for language that clearly reflects their policy choices.”